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
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# IMPLICATIONS OF THE MDAP

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Document No. 19  
 No Change in Class. ☐  
☐ Declassify on: ☐  
 Date: 14 Sept 78  
 BY: [Signature]

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## IMPLICATIONS OF THE MDAP

IN DISCUSSING THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, I THINK IT A FAIR STATEMENT TO SAY THAT THE PROGRAM HAS IN GENERAL BEEN FAVORABLY RECEIVED THROUGHOUT THE NON-SOVIET WORLD. IN SUMMARY, SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAM IS STRONGEST IN THE UK AND CANADA; SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS HAVE DOUBTS AS TO ITS EFFECTIVENESS; NO URGENT PROBLEMS HAVE ARISEN IN THE NEAR EAST; AND IN THE FAR EAST VARIOUS FACTORS WILL LIMIT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF US MILITARY AID. ALTHOUGH THE PROGRAM HAS BEEN SUBJECT TO VIOLENT SOVIET PROPAGANDA ATTACKS, IT HAS NOT ALONE PRODUCED ANY DRASTIC CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY.

### 1. OVER-ALL WORLD REACTION TO MDAP

#### A. UK AND CANADA

THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA OVERWHELMINGLY APPROVE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE MDAP. GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES ARE BOTH SOLIDLY BEHIND THE THESIS THAT THE BUILDING OF MILITARY STRENGTH IN WESTERN EUROPE IS THE BEST INSURANCE AGAINST SOVIET AGGRESSION. IN BOTH COUNTRIES THIS POSITION IS NON-PARTISAN; IT IS NOT AND WILL NOT BECOME A POLITICAL ISSUE. IN BOTH COUNTRIES,

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THE COMMUNISTS AND EXTREME-LEFT DISSENTERS, NEGLIGIBLE IN NUMBERS, ARE POWERLESS TO INFLUENCE ANY APPRECIABLE BODY OF OPINION BY THEIR PROPAGANDA, ALTHOUGH AN OCCASIONAL ACT OF SABOTAGE BY A COMMUNIST MILITANT CANNOT BE COMPLETELY RULED OUT.

**B. WESTERN EUROPE**

WITH THE ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MDAP AT HAND, THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE ARE SHARPLY AWARE THAT A NEW MILITARY ALLIANCE IS SLOWLY TAKING SHAPE. HERETOFORE, THESE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES HAD THOUGHT IN TERMS OF NATIONAL PRIVILEGES AND ECONOMIC RESTORATION. THE NEED ACTIVELY TO SUPPORT TREATY COMMITMENTS HAS DISPELLED SUCH NOTIONS AND HAS OCCASIONED THOROUGH SOUL-SEARCHING.

THE LESSER MEMBERS OF AN ALLIANCE ARE SELDOM ALTOGETHER HAPPY, AND IF THEY OCCUPY A STRATEGICALLY EXPOSED POSITION THEIR DISCOMFORT IS LIKELY TO BE ACUTE. THE EUROPEAN PEOPLES ARE AFRAID -- ON THE ONE HAND OF THE USSR AND COMMUNISM, ON THE OTHER OF THE UNITED STATES. AS LONG AS IT WAS US POLICY TO REVIVE THEIR ECONOMIES, THEY WERE CONTENT; WHEN IT BECAME US POLICY TO INTEGRATE THEIR ECONOMIES, THEY

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WERE DUBIOUS; NOW THAT IT IS US POLICY TO MOBILIZE THEIR RESOURCES IN A MILITARY ALLIANCE THEY ARE FEARFUL. THE IDEA THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WAS A DETERRENT TO WAR SEEMS TO BE GIVING PLACE TO THE IDEA THAT IT IS A PREPARATION FOR WAR, WHILE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE USSR POSSESSES THE ATOMIC BOMB CONTRIBUTES TO THE FEELING OF UNEASINESS.

TO CREATE BY 1954 A WESTERN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE USSR IS OUT OF THE QUESTION, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES. NO EUROPEAN COUNTRY OF DEMOCRATIC PRETENSIONS WOULD MAKE THE SACRIFICES NECESSARY TO SUPPORT SUCH AN ESTABLISHMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE, WITH SUBSTANTIAL US ASSISTANCE, CAN CREATE HIGHLY EFFICIENT "BALANCED COLLECTIVE FORCES" STRONG ENOUGH TO INSURE THAT THE USSR COULD CONQUER EUROPE ONLY BY LAYING IT WASTE BEYOND REPAIR. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD PROBABLY DISSUADE THE USSR FROM MILITARY ADVENTURES IN THE WEST. AT ANY RATE, THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE WILL BE CONTENT WITH NO LESS; THEY

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WILL NOT EMBRACE ANY PLAN OR ADHERE TO ANY POLICY THAT ENVISAGES ANOTHER INVASION AND AN EQUALLY DISASTROUS LIBERATION. UNLESS THEY CAN BE FURNISHED VISIBLE EVIDENCE THAT AT LEAST A POTENTIAL DEFENSIVE FORCE OF SUCH PROPORTIONS WILL BE CREATED, THEIR WILL TO RESIST WILL CONTINUE NEGLIGIBLE, AND THEY WILL BE READY PREY TO COMMUNIST "PEACE" PROPAGANDA. THE WILL-TO-RESIST OF THESE PEOPLES HAS ALREADY BEEN IMPROVED BY THE JOINT ACTION SO FAR TAKEN, BUT IT IS STILL NOT FIRM. ONCE CONVINCED THAT SUCH MINIMUM FORCES CAN BE PLACED IN THE FIELD, THEY WILL REJECT SOVIET "PEACE" OVERTURES AND HONOR THEIR COMMITMENTS.

EVEN FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SUCH FORCES, HOWEVER, AN INCREASING DIVERSION OF THE RESOURCES OF EUROPEAN NATIONS FROM RECOVERY TO DEFENSE WILL BE NECESSARY. THE PROBLEM WHICH NOW FACES THE TREATY POWERS IS TO DETERMINE THE PROPER PROPORTION OF RESOURCES TO BE THUS DIVERTED, AND, PARTICULARLY, TO PERSUADE THE SEVERAL EUROPEAN PEOPLES TO AGREE TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM EUROPEANS WILL EXPECT US LEADERSHIP AND A SUBSTANTIAL US CONTRIBUTION.

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**C. SCANDINAVIA**

NORWAY AND DENMARK ARE COOPERATING SATISFACTORILY WITH THE MDAP AND STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO ENSURE MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF THE MATERIAL BEING RECEIVED. NORWEGIAN PARTICIPATION IS WHOLEHEARTED IN CONTRAST TO THAT OF THE DANES, WHO HAVE MISGIVINGS OVER THE WISDOM OF THEIR MEMBERSHIP IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY. APPARENTLY FEELING THAT THEIR MEMBERSHIP INCREASES THE PROBABILITY OF ATTACK ON THEM IN A FUTURE WAR IN EUROPE, THE DANES SEE LITTLE IMPROVEMENT IN DANISH DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OR ASSURANCE OF EFFECTIVE AID IN CASE OF ATTACK. ALTHOUGH FORMER NEUTRALITY SENTIMENT HAS NOT DECREASED TO THE SAME DEGREE IN DENMARK AS IT HAS IN NORWAY, BOTH COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO LIVE UP TO THEIR OBLIGATIONS AS MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT.

**D. FAR EAST**

A SOLUTION TO THE VARIED PROBLEMS FACING THE INDIGENOUS NON-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS OF THE FAR EAST

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(EXCEPT IN JAPAN) COULD BE FACILITATED BY INCREASING THE SIZE AND EFFICIENCY OF THEIR ARMED FORCES. THREE FACTORS, HOWEVER, WILL LIMIT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF US MILITARY AID TO THESE GOVERNMENTS. FIRST, EACH NATION POSSESSES A VARYING BUT NONETHELESS LIMITED CAPACITY TO ABSORB PROFFERED MILITARY ASSISTANCE. SECOND, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH ASSISTANCE DEPENDS IN LARGE PART UPON THE WILL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF EACH NATION TO OVERCOME INTERNAL DISSIDENCE AND RESIST POSSIBLE EXTERNAL ATTACK. LAST, MILITARY AID, BY ITSELF, IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SOLVE ALL OF EACH NATION'S PROBLEMS, EVEN IF SUCH ASSISTANCE WERE UNLIMITED IN SCALE.

OFFICIAL GOVERNMENTAL REACTION TO PROPOSED OR ALREADY DELIVERED US MILITARY AID HAS BEEN FAVORABLE. IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF THE FAR EAST WHICH ARE HIGHLY SENSITIVE TO NEWLY-WON SOVEREIGNTY OR TO THE NATIONALISTIC ASPIRATIONS OF NEARBY PEOPLES, THESE FAVORABLE GOVERNMENTAL REACTIONS WILL BE CONDITIONED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY BELIEVE NATIONALISM THROUGHOUT THE REGION WILL BE AFFECTED. AMONG THE PEOPLES OF THESE

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COUNTRIES SIMILAR BUT LESS ARTICULATE REACTIONS TO US AID AT HOME AND ELSEWHERE CAN BE ANTICIPATED. EXCEPT FOR STRONGLY ADVERSE PROPAGANDA UTTERANCES, NO REACTION ON THE PART OF ASIAN COMMUNIST POWERS OR LOCAL DISSIDENTS IS AS YET DISCERNABLE.

**E. THE USSR**

THE SOVIET REACTION TO MDAP HAS THUS FAR MAINLY BEEN EVIDENT IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES AND IN SOVIET AND COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. THE USSR HAS NOT PROTESTED OFFICIALLY AND NO OUTSTANDING SOVIET LEADER HAS CONDEMNED MDAP SPECIFICALLY.

THE PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ATTACK ON MDAP HAS BEEN WOVEN INTO THE MORE COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNIST "PEACE EFFORT." ALTHOUGH THE CENTRAL TARGET OF THIS EFFORT HAS BEEN "PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS," MDAP SHIPMENTS HAVE BEEN CITED AS OVERT PROOF OF US "WAR-MONGERING" AND EFFORTS TO MAKE WESTERN EUROPE A "PLACE D'ARMES" FOR ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION. COMMUNIST-LED DEMONSTRATIONS, STRIKES, AND ATTEMPTS TO SABOTAGE MDAP SHIPMENTS HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL,

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LARGELY OWING TO EFFECTIVE POLICE ACTION AND LACK OF POPULAR ENTHUSIASM. THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO MDAP IS INDICATED BY THE KREMLIN'S WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES TO UNPOPULAR CAUSES, EVEN AT THE RISK OF HAVING INDIVIDUAL PARTIES OUTLAWED. ANTI-MDAP PROPAGANDA AND ACTIVITY CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SOVIET "PEACE CAMPAIGN," BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT LOCAL COMMUNISTS WILL BE ABLE TO HAMPER THE PROGRAM SERIOUSLY.

MEANWHILE, WESTERN EFFORTS TO DEFEND AND UNIFY WESTERN EUROPE HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A SOVIET DESIRE TO HASTEN THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOVIET ORBIT. AS ONE OF THE MORE IMPORTANT WESTERN MEASURES, MDAP HAS PROBABLY AFFECTED SOVIET POLICY IN THIS MANNER AND MAY BE USED AS JUSTIFICATION FOR FURTHER SOVIET CONTROL OF SATELLITES. MDAP IN ITSELF, HOWEVER, HAS HAD NO EFFECT ON SOVIET POLICY WHICH CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THE TOTAL EFFECT OF ALL WESTERN DEFENSIVE MEASURES.

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## 2. Reaction to MDAP by Countries.

### A. The United Kingdom.

The UK Government strongly supports MDAP because it strengthens Britain's armed forces, will increase Western Europe's military strength, and will broaden US responsibilities for Western European defense.

The British electorate overwhelmingly favors Britain's participation in MDAP, and supports the Government's position in this matter. Only Britain's negligible left wing is opposed to the program as conducive to war. The issue is of no importance in British politics. No responsible press organ and no responsible group of British citizens have at any time objected to the presence in the UK of the US B-29 groups. Although the insignificant Communist Party has attempted from time to time to fan public resentment over this question and over the government's policy of close military collaboration with the US, it has had no success.

### B. Canada.

The Canadian Government supports the objectives of MDAP. Canada itself is not receiving and will not request any equipment under the MDAP program. It does, however, desire to buy US material for cash and wishes to reach agreement with the US on some form of reciprocal purchasing such as the World War II Hyde Park Agreement. The Canadian public supports the government and the subject is not a political issue. Although the small Communist Party and its sympathizers oppose MDAP and the North Atlantic Treaty and can be expected to continue to do so, they will be unable to influence public opinion to any appreciable extent and the government not at all.

### C. Norway.

The Norwegian Government is cooperating wholeheartedly with MDAP and is taking measures to insure maximum utilization of the material being received. The government and Norwegians generally are convinced that implementation of the NAT is the best available means of preventing war. Norway's continued cooperation is assured and as its defense becomes more effective through arms aid and internal production the effectiveness of the small minority opposition will decrease. The Communist Party is waging an active propaganda campaign against Norwegian participation in the NAT and the MDAP program, is not strong enough to launch any effective interference with MDAP implementation. The Norwegian Labor Party, the Defense Department, and the Foreign Office have inaugurated an extensive public information program to counter Communist anti-MDAP propaganda and keep the people informed of progress toward rebuilding Norway's defenses.

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D. Denmark.

Denmark is cooperating in the Military Aid Program and is making efforts to ensure efficient utilization of the material being received. The Danish Government has indicated misgivings, however—which are shared by the Danish people—over its entry into the North Atlantic Treaty because there is not yet any visible assurance that Denmark's defensive situation has improved. The prospect of again being overrun and later liberated is understandably real to the Danes and they reason that NAT membership increases the probability of attack on them in a future war in Europe. Among some members of the Government Party there is also concern over the economic impact of increased defense costs incident to NAT membership. Although Denmark will continue to live up to its obligations as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty, Danish participation will lack vigor and resolution until Denmark's defensive capabilities are increased by arms aid and internal military production and there is more tangible assurance of effective aid in case of attack.

As in Norway, the Communist Party has levelled a vigorous propaganda attack on Danish participation in MDAP, but anti-MDAP propaganda is not likely to alter Denmark's fulfillment of its MDAP obligations and Communist strength is insufficient to interfere with the implementation of the program.

E. France.

a. General attitude: The Government favors the MDAP as a means of rebuilding French military strength, may be expected to give full cooperation, and is unlikely to withdraw. The public generally lacks confidence in the ultimate success of the program, but presently is basically favorable. There is considerable criticism of the MDAP and lack of confidence in its effectiveness in intellectual circles where neutrality sentiment is most evident. Opposition to MDAP will increase if military expenditures are required at the expense of continued economic progress and if France's role in NAT strategic plans is to provide the infantry whereas others supply sea and air power.

b. Will to resist: Prospective receipt of MDAP material has improved the morale of the armed forces and probably increased their will to resist, but it has had no appreciable effect in countering the general lassitude of the people and their fear of war. Prospects that the will to resist will be strengthened to any great extent are doubtful, because of general public skepticism as to the efficacy of the MDAP in guaranteeing their security.

c. Ability to resist: MDAP has not to date increased French ability to resist. Only three partial shiploads of materiel, consisting of

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a few guns, signal, and other equipment, have been received. When shipment of all items programmed for France has been completed, ability to resist will be improved.

d. Communist intentions: The main effort of the Communist Party will be to promote the "peace campaign" in non-Communist circles, endeavoring to create widespread pressure on the Government in favor of neutrality and withdrawal from the MDAP. Attempts to disrupt MDAP shipments and sabotage French munitions manufacture will not be abandoned.

e. Reaction to change in MDAP law regarding machines for arms production: There will be little reaction except among those officials actually working with the Program, who will favor the increased flexibility possible under the revision.

f. Reaction to Soviet possession of A-bomb: Announcement that the USSR was producing the atom bomb did not produce an immediate serious reaction. Knowledge that the US no longer had a monopoly on atomic arms has, however, increased the desire to avoid another conflict, strengthened doubts of US ability to protect Western Europe, raised questions concerning the efficacy of MDAP rearmament to ward off a Soviet atomic attack.

F. The Netherlands and Belgium.

a. General attitude: The great majority of the people favor MDAP and neither government is likely to withdraw from the NAT.

b. Will to resist: The knowledge that MDAP equipment is forthcoming and the arrival of initial small shipments have probably increased slightly the will of the people to resist aggression. Any appreciable increase in Dutch and Belgian will to resist will depend upon further shipments and the actual utilization of the equipment by the armed forces.

c. Ability to resist: The Dutch and Belgians presently have little ability to resist aggression and it will be some time before US military aid, their own efforts and over-all Western European defensive measures, make an effective defensive force of the Belgian and Netherlands armed forces. Financial commitments for the repatriation of Dutch forces in Indonesia will prevent the concentration of Dutch resources on European defense during 1950.

d. Communist intentions: The primary Communist objective is to prevent the unloading of MDAP equipment and to obtain non-Communist labor support in this objective. The Communists use every propaganda device at their command and usually tie their anti-MDAP campaign to some phase of the "peace campaign."

e. Reaction to change in MDAP law regarding machines for arms production: High Dutch and Belgian civilian and military officials will react favorably, but the great majority of the people are not well enough acquainted with the details of the program to have an opinion on the amendment. The Dutch officials believe increased self-sufficiency in armament production will alleviate the country's large dollar deficit.

f. Reaction to Soviet possession of A-bomb: The initial announcement of the Soviet possession of the atom bomb was received calmly. If anything, it strengthened determination to unite Europe politically, economically and militarily.

G. Italy.

a. General attitude: The Italian Government is in general favorably disposed to the MDAP and views its implementation as important to the government's prestige and stability. It has no intention of withdrawing. It is apprehensive, however, lest the program reduce US economic aid and lest cost of implementing MDAP jeopardize socio-economic progress and political

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stability. The Italians also desire the approaches to the Po Valley to be part of the primary line to be defended by joint Western European forces. There remains some resentment over the failure of Italy to obtain equal representation with France and the UK on the top MDAP committee.

General public apathy toward MDAP is caused by the strong tendency to regard Western economic benefits more highly than military benefits.

b. Will to resist: Italian will to resist, now quite low, has been affected only slightly by MDAP and will increase slowly as military and economic integration of Italy with the rest of Western Europe grows.

g. Ability to resist: Although MDAP will improve Italy's ability to resist, the extent of improvement is severely limited by: (1) the Italian Peace Treaty; (2) Italy's low economic potential; and (3) Italy's "frontier" position.

d. Communist intentions: The major active opposition to MDAP is centered in the Italian Communist Party (PCI), its allied Socialist groups (the PSI), and the Communist dominated labor unions (CGIL). With little hope of preventing the arming of the Italian Armed Forces under the MDAP program, the Communists are not likely to initiate large-scale sabotage or strikes directly against MDAP implementation. Rather the Communists will probably concentrate on merging their "peace" campaign with exploitation of local and national socio-economic issues. They will have some success in these efforts. At the same time, strikes and demonstrations over unemployment and other economic issues will probably be justified partly by blaming the government's preoccupation with the military adventures to the exclusion of Italian social and economic problems.

e. Attitude toward arms machinery amendment: The government has expressed some dismay over the rigidity and red tape associated with a relatively small amount of dollar assistance under AMP. Therefore, anything which permits greater flexibility, such as the proposed machinery amendment, will be greeted favorably.

f. Effect of the Soviet possession of the A-bomb: There is a considerable feeling of futility over Italy's role in a US-USSR conflict. This sense of futility was accentuated somewhat by USSR possession of the A-bomb.

#### H. Portugal.

a. Will to resist: The people as a whole passively support the Salazar Government and would resist aggression to the best of their ability. Receipt

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of MDAP aid would improve the morale of the armed forces and thus increase the will to resist aggression.

b. Ability to resist: Portugal has received no MDAP aid to date. The receipt of coastal defense equipment would increase the ability of the Portuguese to resist aggression but without large scale military aid they would be unable to offer appreciable resistance to a sustained attack.

c. Communist intentions: The small Communist Party in Portugal is so closely repressed by the police and security forces that it would be able to exert little influence in connection with MDAP.

d. Attitude toward arms machinery amendment: The Salazar Government would probably favor such a "national industry" if it were equipped to manufacture munitions, but its benefits would be severely limited by the shortages of qualified technicians, raw materials, foreign exchange, and investment capital.

e. Reaction to Soviet possession of A-bomb: The Portuguese feel that the need is now greater than ever for defense plans organized by the US and closer military contacts between all Western nations. Generally, it is felt that the US is still far ahead of the USSR in atomic weapons and research.

#### I. Spain.

a. Will to resist: The Spanish people have always strongly resisted foreign aggression, hence military aid to the Franco Government would not increase their will to resist.

b. Ability to resist: Foreign aid would increase the ability of the Spanish army to resist aggression. Spain would require a vast amount of aid, however, to maintain an armed force on a modern war footing for any extended period of time in view of shortages in capital, transport equipment, industrial plant and power facilities, natural resources, and agricultural capacity.

c. Communist intentions: The Spanish Communist Party is numerically small and at present weakened by the growth of a "Titoist" movement. Military aid to the Franco Government would undoubtedly increase the present and potential effectiveness of Communist anti-US and peace offensive propaganda.

d. Proposed amendment on arms production machinery: The amendment would be warmly received by the armed forces and government officials. Its usefulness would be severely limited by the inefficiency of the Spanish state enterprises, especially munitions manufacture; by the lack of technical ability; and by the shortage of foreign exchange to import such materials as special steels and aluminum alloys.

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e. Reaction to Soviet possession of the A-bomb: The Spanish people are not permitted access to world news except as censored by the government. Franco in public statements has minimized the importance, and even expressed his doubt of Russian possession of the A-bomb. The Spanish press rarely deals with the subject of Russian air power, i.e., capacity to deliver the A-bomb behind the Pyrenees, presumably to support Franco's expressed belief that the Pyrenees barrier forms a natural Maginot Line.

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J. Iran

The Iranian Government and the people in general strongly favor the MDAP. Opposition is confined almost wholly to the small pro-Soviet minority. The Shah is determined to improve the capabilities of the armed forces in order to improve internal security, protect Iran's borders against Soviet infiltration, and, in the event of Soviet invasion, to fight delaying actions and conduct guerrilla warfare. His determination to strengthen the army is so strong that he would probably divert funds needed for economic and social improvement if military aid were not forthcoming.

Recently Iran obtained from the US under a purchase agreement a quantity of military supplies and equipment as a step toward modernizing the Iranian armed forces. The Iranian Army is making efficient use of this materiel, and training in its use and maintenance is proceeding satisfactorily. Moreover, receipt of the materiel among the various units has had a telling effect on army morale. In the light of this experience, it may be assumed that the Iranians will put to equally effective use any materiel received under MDAP.

The Iranian armed forces are Iran's most important bulwark against instability and, if properly equipped and trained, could be an effective instrument for harassing a Soviet invasion if such should take place.

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K. Turkey

The government and people of Turkey, almost unanimous in their determination to resist Soviet demands which would infringe upon Turkey's national sovereignty and territorial independence, are wholeheartedly in favor of the continuation of US military aid programs. These programs have already made considerable progress toward achieving their purpose; the creation of a compact, mobile, modern, and efficient national defense force increasingly capable of offering resistance to aggression by a major power, while at the same time reducing the severe burden upon the national economy of the maintenance of large forces under arms in the face of a continuing Soviet threat. The MDAP, together with US economic, financial, and technical aid programs, is also of major significance in bolstering the Turks' determination, as well as their military and economic ability, to resist aggression, and to pursue their policy of close association with the US and other western democracies in opposing Soviet/Communist imperialistic expansionism.

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#### L. Greece

Greece has demonstrated its ability and determination to resist Communist aggression during the three-year guerrilla war which ended, at least temporarily, in the fall of 1949. The Greek armed forces have been gradually reduced since then from a peak of about 250,000 to a present strength of about 170,000. Further contemplated reductions will bring the total strength down to about 124,000 by January 1951. Of the roughly \$500 million military aid given by the US to Greece in the last three years, most has perforce been expended in fighting the guerrillas. Thus the smaller Greek armed forces still need equipment and weapons to replace worn-out items and to increase their mobility and striking power. While the 350-odd guerrillas still within Greece present no great problem, perhaps 10,000 combat-fit guerrilla reserves now across the borders in Albania and Bulgaria are a potential threat to Greek security. By the fall and winter of 1950 there is a distinct possibility that the guerrillas, with a combat potential of perhaps 20,000 by then, may try to renew their attacks on Greece. The Greek armed forces must be ready to meet such a threat from the start.

#### M. Saudi Arabia

The Dhahran Airbase, built and operated by the US but legally belonging to the Saudi Arabian Government, has been leased to the US by short-term agreements since 1945. The contract, which was to expire on 23 June, has now been extended to 1 February 1951. In exchange for a long-term agreement, King Ibn Saud would undoubtedly demand US military aid, probably including a grant-in-aid for free arms. The King alleges fear of aggression by his dynastic rivals, the Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Jordan; nevertheless, his calculation of the aid necessary to deter such aggression appears excessive. It is believed that the King will continue to extend the airbase agreement on a short-term basis even though his requests for aid are not completely filled.

#### N. Union of South Africa

No known formal request for military assistance from the US has been made by the Union of South Africa, although if the nation were eligible for military aid under the North Atlantic Pact, the military authorities in the Union would be most desirous of obtaining US equipment as a gift.

The military planners of the Union generally think in terms of internal security, although in case of hostilities between East and West, they plan to make available to the West one armored division with air support. Even to achieve this objective, the Union will need considerable amounts of technical equipment from the UK, the traditional source, as well as aid from the US. Without additional equipment, the Union could probably maintain internal security, but its contribution in foreign areas would be limited by an equipment shortage and the isolationist feelings of a large segment of the population.

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0. Liberia

The Liberian Army consists of a Frontier Force of about 1500 men, whose function is to maintain internal security and police Liberian borders. The Frontier Force is badly trained and poorly equipped. Although the Force was able to control the recent riots at the Firestone Plantations, it would be unable to control a major native uprising. Since the Firestone Plantations are of economic value to the US, and because of the strategic importance of the port of Monrovia and Roberts Field, both controlled by US companies, a well-trained and well-equipped Frontier Force is necessary for protection of US interests as well as maintenance of internal security. A small organization trained in tropical warfare and equipped and trained in the use of short-wave radio would be most effective. A survey of the Liberian military situation has recently been completed by a US army officer, and recommendations will shortly be presented to the Liberian Government.

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P. China.

The two forces potentially available for exploitation in opposition to the consolidation of Communism in China, (the Nationalist Government on Taiwan and the dissident elements within Chinese Communist-controlled areas on the mainland) hold little promise at this time for realization of US objectives through military exploitation.

1. Nationalist Regime on Taiwan.

The US-recognized National Government on Taiwan is a regime largely discredited in the eyes of its own people, whether their inclinations are pro- or anti-Communist. In the past, provision of large quantities of US military aid did not prevent the decline of the Nationalist regime. At the present time the US is providing no military assistance to the Chinese Nationalists.

a. Present situation requiring military aid: From a purely military standpoint, the Chinese Nationalist Government holds a strong defensive position on Taiwan. Provided Nationalist military resources are employed with determination, the regime possesses a considerable potential for resisting Chinese Communist attack. Moreover, the provision of modest quantities of naval and air force material aid, primarily for maintenance, could substantially increase the Nationalist capability for survival. It is believed, however, that the Chinese Nationalists lack both the will to resist a determined Communist effort and the ability to utilize effectively the resources already at their disposal. Moreover, Communist infiltration and subversive activities on Taiwan further reduce the potential effectiveness of US aid.

While past US aid has not been effective militarily, it has served to perpetuate the Nationalist regime politically and, in the economic field, has bolstered the regime's financial reserves.

b. Estimated results of renewing US military aid: Renewal of US military assistance would be greeted favorably by the Nationalists and would increase the potential of the Nationalist armed forces. Granting such aid would: (1) fail to rally popular Chinese support to the Nationalist cause; (2) neither overcome existing Nationalist disunity and ineptness, nor assure effective employment of the improved forces; (3) defer disintegration of the Nationalist Government at the risk, however, of committing the US to prolonged financial support and even future direct military involvement; (4) permit the conservation of the remaining Nationalist financial resources and tend to promote economic stability; (5) probably accelerate Communist preparations for the takeover of Taiwan; and (6) intensify Chinese Communist propaganda concerning the "imperialist role of the US in the Far East" and increase the tendency to accept the charge at face value in those non-Communist countries

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of the Far East where nationalism is at present an issue.

c. Estimated result of withholding US aid: If US military aid to the Nationalist Government is not renewed, Taiwan will probably come under Chinese Communist control within the next twelve months. Short of direct involvement of US forces, however, there is no assurance against this eventuality.

2. Dissident groups on the Chinese mainland.

a. Present situation requiring military aid: Popular discontent with the Chinese Communist regime on the mainland is believed to be increasing. In addition to general popular dissatisfaction, the Chinese Communists have admitted the existence of some 400,000 armed dissidents on the mainland, mainly south of the Yangtze River. The principal motivation of these groups is economic and their numbers include professional bandits, isolated ex-Nationalist troops of various persuasions and disgruntled peasants. However, none of these dissident elements identified to date appears suitable for effective external exploitation. They lack leadership, unity of purpose, and over-all organization.

b. Estimated results of providing US military aid: Efforts to support selected dissident groups through the provision of US military aid could serve to annoy the Communist regime, at this time, but could accomplish little more. The absence of leadership and cohesion would probably prevent conclusive results from aid on a major scale for the purpose of causing the downfall of the Communist regime. External military aid might, in fact, stimulate a general xenophobic reaction among the mainland Chinese which would bind them more closely to the Communists and be interpreted by other Far Eastern powers as evidence of US "imperialism".

c. Estimated results of withholding US aid: Although the withholding of US military aid from mainland groups may be interpreted in some quarters as evidence of a lack of US determination to oppose Communism, such inaction under circumstances would not, in fact, greatly accelerate the consolidation of Communist control over China.

Q. Korea.

a. Present situation requiring military aid: The Republic of Korea established under US and UN guidance and support, is faced with the constant possibility of open invasion by the Soviet-supported People's Army of northern Korea and the daily problem of preserving internal security in the face of Communist guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion, within its own boundaries.

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b. Effectiveness of aid already granted: US military aid to Korea has been utilized to the maximum, as a result of effective functioning of the US Korean military advisory group and the favorable attitude of the Korean Government and people. The US-assisted Korean Army has: (1) maintained sufficient internal security to permit progress in the ECA program for rehabilitation and development of the Korean economy; and (2) acted as a deterrent to possible northern Korean aggression.

c. Reactions to US military aid: Reactions to US military aid have been entirely favorable in southern Korea although there have been complaints that the military aid was insufficient. The US intention to continue Korean aid, under MDAP, has been an important psychological factor in maintaining the firm will of the Republic's leaders and military personnel to continue resistance to heavy Communist pressure, threats, and intimidation. Korean Communist propaganda reaction has been unfavorable, but no effective Communist attempts have been made to stop US military aid to southern Korea.

d. Future Aid: Continued US aid will serve to: (1) maintain the southern Korean will to resist Communism; (2) prevent open invasion from the north; and (3) permit continued development of the Korean economy and democratic government. US aid at levels higher than current authorizations would be effective in offsetting the superior military potential of the opposing forces, particularly in artillery and aircraft. US military aid to Korea is, nonetheless, no positive guarantee against successful Communist invasion. A marked curtailment or halt of US military aid to Korea, however, would be followed by: (1) a serious deterioration in Korean Army materiel; (2) a marked reduction in Korean morale; (3) a significant increase in the susceptibility of Army personnel, government leaders and the people to Communist pressure; and (4) a decisive increase in the Communist capacity to exhaust the Republic's strength by guerrilla warfare.

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2. Indochina.

a. Present situation requiring military aid: A strong nationalist uprising is engaged in open revolt against French authority in Vietnam. The French Government has attempted a political solution to this problem and, by recognizing the French-sponsored "State of Vietnam" (as distinct from Ho Chi Minh's Communist-led "Republic") the US formally acknowledged its satisfaction that the French were making a sincere effort to meet Vietnamese nationalist demands. The growing threat posed by the military activities of the Communist-led "Republic of Vietnam" (which has been recognized as a legal government by the USSR and Communist China), as well as the threat to US interests in Southeast Asia posed by developments in China, led to a decision to extend economic and military aid to France and the Indochinese states.

b. Effectiveness of US aid: A force of 150,000 Western-trained troops (40 percent of whom are European professional soldiers) under capable French command is bearing the brunt of the combat in Vietnam. It is anticipated that US aid will bring diminishing returns because of limitations on the expansion of French military strength, the divided attitude of the Vietnamese population, and the strength, stability, and prospects for expansion of Vietnam's Communist-led rebel movement. It is apparent that the active support of the majority of the population cannot be obtained by military means alone; consequently, US military aid can do little more than maintain the status quo.

c. Reactions to US military aid: Although much of the French press in Saigon suspects the US of ulterior motives and criticizes the "parsimonious" character of US aid, the reaction of the French Government is favorable. There has been a noticeable apathy, however, among those Vietnamese most inclined to be pro-US. This attitude stems from suspicion that US aid will permit the French to perpetuate their control.

Propaganda of the Communist-led rebel regime in Indochina is violently critical of all US motives, actions and presumed intentions.

d. Future aid: A continuation or expansion of US aid would: (1) increase the effectiveness of the forces under French military command, and thereby provide additional time and opportunity for the implementation of a political solution to the Vietnamese dispute; (2) provide for the development of a Vietnamese army which, if under the control of the State of Vietnam rather than under the French High Command, would be potentially more effective against the rebel force than alien troops. A curtailment or cessation of US aid would insure ultimate defeat of the French and their nominal Vietnamese allies and the establishment of a pro-Soviet government in Indochina. Curtailment of military aid, in turn, would probably lead to the same eventual result.

S. Thailand.

a. Present situation requiring military aid: Thailand's adjacency both to unsettled Indochina and Burma, and to Communist China, has raised serious doubts among the Thai as to their prospects for survival as a non-Communist nation. Although the Communist movement in Thailand at present is not militant and poses no immediate threat, it is doubtful that the Thai Armed Forces, as currently organized and equipped, could long cope with a Communist-led "liberation movement", and certain that they would be unable to resist an invasion in force. Military assistance would increase Thailand's capabilities to police and guard its frontiers and would maintain a Thai psychological attitude favorable to the West. Thailand's present political leaders are believed to be genuinely anti-Communist and pro-US, but it is only while they feel confident of the US interest in maintaining a strong position in the Far East that they will continue this orientation.

b. Effectiveness of US military aid: No US military aid has yet been received. Future US aid would raise the efficiency and morale of the Thai armed forces, and increase their ability to maintain internal order. US aid will not, however, appreciably increase Thailand's presently non-existent capabilities for resisting strong external aggression. US aid should also induce the Thai Government to take a more positive anti-Communist position, would increase Premier Phibul's prestige and political stature, and should result in closer cooperation with the US.

c. Reactions to US military aid: Government and military leaders have viewed forthcoming military aid with great enthusiasm and the non-Communist press has indicated general approval. All vocal pro-Communist and Communist elements have expressed disapproval of US military assistance.

d. Effects of US aid: Granting of US military assistance would: (1) replace obsolete and heterogeneous materiel with modern, standardized equipment; and (2) increase the capabilities of the Thai Armed Forces if accompanied by an improved and expanded training program. Curtailment of US aid would prevent increased efficiency and capabilities on the part of Thailand's Armed Forces; termination of aid, at this time, would leave the Armed Forces in their present inefficient condition. The US would suffer a serious loss of influence, and Thailand's presently pro-West Government leaders would doubt the US will and ability to oppose Communism in the Far East, thus resulting in Thai accommodation to Soviet and Chinese Communist pressures.



T. Burma

1. Present situation requiring military aid

Although Government armed forces have recently made progress against both Communist and non-Communist insurgents in Burma, widespread unrest will continue for some time. The UK and the Commonwealth, which have provided Burma with almost all its military equipment, are incapable of providing all of the materiel needed by Burmese forces. In addition to internal disorders, Burma faces the threat of Chinese Communist activities along an undefined and ill-guarded border. The Burmese Government, heretofore neutral in the East-West dispute, has recently made a number of requests for US military assistance.

2. Effectiveness of US aid

The provision of patrol craft would increase the ability of the Burmese Government to cope with insurgent activity which is currently disrupting important river traffic. Such assistance, which is supplementary to efforts of the Burmese themselves to maintain their own national security, and complementary to military aid made available by the British Commonwealth and the UK, would assist in developing a pro-Western Burma.

3. Reactions to US aid

Delivery of these vessels would be well received in Burma, and wide, favorable reaction is expected. The Communists and their sympathizers, including certain left-wing Socialists who ostensibly support the Government, denounce the acceptance of aid as a step toward subservience to the US.

4. Future aid

Although contemplated US aid to Burma presently consists of this single project, it would (1) fill a serious gap in the UK-Commonwealth military aid program for Burma; and (2) assist Burma's economic rehabilitation by fully reopening the nation's waterways to commerce.

Failure of this aid to materialize would retard the growing trend of Burmese cooperation with the West.

U. The Philippines

1. Present situation requiring military aid

The Philippine Government's chief problem, the solution of which requires military aid, is the containment of the Communist-led Huk movement and the maintenance of law and order during the period needed to effect basic economic and political reforms and thereby achieve long-range stability. The Huks, for the most part disaffected peasant guerrillas, have generally terrorized the Central Luzon countryside. Philippine Government Forces, supplied and equipped entirely with US materiel, have been able to break up major Huk concentrations, but have not been able to prevent destructive Huk raids.

2. Effectiveness of US aid

US aid has helped to maintain the pro-US orientation of the Philippine Republic and to provide needed military support beyond the financial resources of the Philippines.

3. Reactions to US military aid

The reaction to US military aid has been generally favorable, although there have been complaints that the aid was insufficient—a criticism which may increase as Chinese Communist expansion continues. The Communist minority claims that US aid is aimed at maintaining imperialistic US control. Increased US utilization of Philippine bases could result in acceptance of this propaganda charge by some ardent nationalistic non-Communists who view the US use of these bases as infringements of Philippine sovereignty.

4. Future Aid

Continuation or expansion of US aid would: (1) improve the capabilities of the Armed Force to combat the Huk threat to internal security; (2) maintain the presently strong US orientation of the Philippine Government and people. Curtailment of US aid would make it impossible for the Philippine Government's forces to maintain even their present capability to provide internal security. In addition to Huk activities, therefore, general lawlessness would increase. The Filipinos would feel that the US was abandoning them to the Communist orbit, and pressure on the Government to adopt a neutral policy or make a partial accommodation to Communism would probably result.

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## V. Indonesia

### 1. Present situation requiring military aid.

The new government of Indonesia is faced with the problem of demobilizing some 200,000 guerrillas who fought together with the Indonesian Army against the Dutch. Although some of these irregulars are Communist-led and stand in opposition to the present government of the USI, the great majority are simply roving bands whose continued presence as an armed force threatens to destroy the progress already made in the rehabilitation of the country's economy. If these bands are not disarmed, their activities may well result in a general withdrawal of Western investors and technical personnel from Indonesia, an event which would intensify the seriousness of problems facing the young regime. The problem is largely one of effective policing, and this burden now rests upon the Army, which is attempting to perform police functions in addition to its other duties, including the suppression of dissident political groups. Military aid is required for the arming and training of such a police force in order to free the Army for national defense duties. Extensive smuggling has also created a serious economic problem for the new government. A solution of this problem will depend on the development of an effective coastal patrol which, in turn, depends on the availability of patrol craft and assistance in training.

### 2. Effectiveness of US Aid.

The provision of badly needed equipment could assist materially in helping the new Indonesian government meet its primary problem -- the establishment and maintenance of law and order. This assistance would also help maintain the present pro-Western orientation of the Indonesian Government.

### 3. Reactions to US military aid.

A US military aid program would be generally welcomed by the government, the armed forces, and business interests throughout Indonesia. There will be some Dutch suspicion that such aid is designed to enhance the US commercial position. US aid would be opposed by the Communists and other political dissidents in propaganda utterances, but no effective resistance to the development of a constabulary or the suppression of smuggling is anticipated.

### 4. Future Aid.

Continuation or expansion of US aid would: bolster the Government's ability to quell lawlessness and disorder and assist the economic rehabilitation of the USI. Curtailment of US aid would increase the difficulty of establishing and maintaining law and order in Indonesia, thus aggravating present economic dislocations and possibly leading eventually to a denial of

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of Indonesian tin and oil to the West. Under circumstances of increasing internal disorder, moreover, the USI's present Western orientation would give way to accommodation to the growing strength of local Communists and pro-Communists.

W. Malaya.

No US military aid has been requested for Malaya and none is presently being offered. For the past two years, however, the British in Malaya have attempted unsuccessfully to suppress a Communist Chinese terrorist movement, in which approximately 3,000 - 5,000 men are holding down 36,000 British troops and 70,000 police and constabulary forces. Losses inflicted by the British on the terrorists have been offset by recruitment from Malaya's large Chinese population. The situation has steadily deteriorated since November 1949, terrorist forces have recently shown a definite improvement in military technique, and further terrorist successes are anticipated. Although Malaya's export economy has not yet been seriously affected, exports of tin and rubber cannot be maintained if the present situation continues indefinitely.

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APPENDIX I

Military Budgets of MDAP Countries

United Kingdom

Fiscal Year Beginning 1 April 1950  
(millions of dollars, converted at rate of \$2.80 to the £)

Defense Expenditure <sup>1</sup>	Total Budget <sup>2</sup>	National Income <sup>2</sup>	Defense % of total Budget	Defense % of National Income
2,326.2	10,934	28,000	20	8

1. Defense Estimates as submitted to Parliament, plus CIA estimate of other expenditures attributable to defense.
2. CIA Estimate.

CANADA

Fiscal Year Beginning 1 April 1950  
(millions of US dollars, converted at rate of US \$.909 = C\$1.00)

Defense Expenditure <sup>1</sup>	Total Budget <sup>2</sup>	National Income <sup>3</sup>	Defense % of total Budget	Defense % of National Income
386	2,099	11,817	18	3.3

1. Defense Estimates presented to Parliament.
2. As presented to Parliament.
3. CIA Estimate

NORWAY

Fiscal Year Beginning 1 July 1950  
(millions of dollars, converted at rate of 7.14 Kroner = \$1)

Defense Expenditure	Total Budget	Net National Product <sup>2</sup>	Defense % of total Budget	Defense % of Net National Product
41.3 <sup>1</sup>	359 <sup>1</sup>	1,522	11.5	2.7

1. Estimates submitted to Parliament and passed substantially as submitted.
2. ECA estimate of Net National Product. National Income estimate not available.

ICELAND

No military expenditures.

DENMARK

Fiscal Year Beginning 1 April 1950  
(millions of dollars, converted at rate of 6.92 Kroner = \$1)

Defense Expenditure	Total Budget	Net National Product <sup>2</sup>	Defense % of total Budget	Defense % of Net National Product
51 <sup>1</sup>	297 <sup>1</sup>	2,457	17.1	2.1

1. Estimates submitted to Parliament.
2. CIA estimate - National Income estimate not available.

BELGIUM

Fiscal Year Beginning 1 January 1950  
(millions of dollars, converted at rate of 50 francs = \$1)

Defense Expenditure	Total Budget <sup>1</sup>	National Income <sup>2</sup>	Defense % of total Budget <sup>3</sup>	Defense % of National Income
163.6	1,595	4,980	10.25	3.28

1. Total government expenditures budgeted.
2. Estimated national income for 1950.

NETHERLANDS

Fiscal Year Beginning 1 January 1950  
(millions of dollars, converted at rate of 3.8 guilders = \$1)

Defense Expenditure	Total Budget	National Income <sup>1</sup>	Defense % of total Budget	Defense % of National Income
307	1,193	3,737	25.7	8.2

1. National income for 1949; 1950 estimate not available.

LUXEMBOURG

Fiscal Year Beginning 1 January 1950  
(millions of dollars, converted at rate of 50 francs = \$1)

Defense Expenditure	Total Budget	National Income <sup>1</sup>	Defense % of total Budget	Defense % of National Income
4.734 <sup>2</sup>	77	180	6.2	2.6

1. National income for 1948 (latest available).
2. Includes Gendarmerie and Police.

FRANCE

Fiscal Year Beginning 1 January 1950  
(millions of dollars, converted at rate of 350 francs = \$1)

Defense Expenditure	Total Budget	National Income <sup>1</sup>	Defense % of total Budget	Defense % of National Income
1,200 <sup>2</sup>	6,391	23,157	18.7	5.2

1. CIA estimate
2. Additional expenditures for military purposes of \$423 million are included in budgets of other ministries.

ITALY

Fiscal Year Beginning 1 July 1950  
(millions of dollars, converted at rate of 624 lire = \$1)

Defense Expenditure	Total Budget <sup>1</sup>	National Income <sup>1</sup>	Defense % of total Budget	Defense % of National Income
517 <sup>2</sup>	2,240	11,200	23.8	4.62

1. CIA estimate.
2. Includes Carabinieri (national police).

PORTUGAL

Fiscal Year Beginning 1 January 1950.  
(millions of dollars, converted at rate of 28.75 escudos = \$1)

Defense Expenditure <sup>1</sup>	Total Budget	National Income <sup>1</sup>	Defense % of total Budget	Defense % of National Income
43.7	183.2	1,300	23.9	3.4

1. CIA estimate.

TURKEY

Fiscal Year 1950-51

Defense Expenditure <sup>1</sup>	Total Budget	National Income <sup>2</sup>	Defense % of total Budget	Defense % of National Income
\$193,960,300	\$528,000,000	\$2,913,000,000	36.77	6.66

1. Includes auxiliary services.  
2. ECA Estimate

IRAN

Fiscal Year ending 20 March 1950.  
(There is no reliable estimate for FY 1950-51.)

Defense Expenditure <sup>1</sup>	Total Budget <sup>1</sup>	National Income <sup>2</sup>	Defense % of total Budget	Defense % of National Income
\$78,125,000	\$347,437,500	---	22.5	---

1. Actual total expenditures were only about \$250,000,000. Actual defense expenditures are not known.  
2. No figures exist on the national income.



GRUDGE

Fiscal Year 1949-50

Defense Expenditure <sup>1</sup>	Total Budget	National Income <sup>1</sup>	Defense % of total Budget	Defense % of National Income
\$146,667,000	\$383,000,000	\$1,280,000,000	38.3	11.5

1. ECA estimate.

## APPENDIX II

1. Military Personnel Strength of MDAP Countries.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total</u>
United Kingdom	369,000	144,400	202,400	715,800 <sup>a</sup>
Canada	20,670	9,440	16,670	47,060
Iceland	-	-	-	-
Norway	17,650	6,200	4,125	27,975
Denmark	17,500	4,400	850	22,750
France	500,300	59,082	66,764	626,146 <sup>c</sup>
Netherlands	71,000	30,000 <sup>d</sup>	8,000	109,100 <sup>b</sup>
Belgium	59,500	1,282	9,767	70,049 <sup>b</sup>
Italy	245,000 <sup>f</sup>	34,887	26,479	306,366
Portugal	46,000	7,630 <sup>d</sup>	2,039	55,669 <sup>e</sup>
Turkey	273,000 <sup>g</sup>	18,450	22,055	313,505
Iran	133,331	2,600	2,851	138,782
Greece	15,200 <sup>h</sup>	11,700 <sup>i</sup>	6,120 <sup>i</sup>	169,620

<sup>a</sup> Excludes 64,000 colonial troops

<sup>b</sup> Excludes colonials

<sup>c</sup> Plus 60,000 Gendarmerie

<sup>d</sup> Includes naval air arm

<sup>e</sup> Plus 7,000 National Republican Guard and 5,500 Fiscal Guard

<sup>f</sup> Includes 75,000 Carabinieri

<sup>g</sup> Includes Gendarmerie of 24,500 and Customs Guards of 13,500. The army will be reduced from 22 to 16 divisions under the advice and guidance of US Military Mission

<sup>h</sup> As of 30 April 1950 includes Gendarmerie of 23,200

<sup>i</sup> As of 30 April 1950

<sup>i</sup> As of 31 March 1950

2. Naval Craft of MDAP Countries.A. United Kingdom (As of 1 April 1950).

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Operational</u>	<u>Non-Operational</u>	<u>Reserve</u>
Battleship	5	1	-	4
Fleet Carrier	6	4	1	1
Light Fleet Carrier	6	5	-	1
Light Cruiser	24	14	3	7
Destroyer	112	48	4	60
Escort	169	39	7	123
Submarine	63	30	3	30
Fleet Minesweeper	68	11	-	57
Totals	453	152	18	229

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B. Canada (As of 1 June 1950).

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Operational</u>	<u>Non-Operational</u>	<u>Reserve</u>
Light Fleet Carrier	1	1	0	0
Light Cruiser	2	1	0	1
Destroyer	11	4	1	6
Escort	6	2	1	3
Fleet Minesweeper	9	0	1	8
Totals	29	8	3	18

C. Iceland (As of 1 June 1950).

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D. Norway (As of 1 June 1950).

Destroyer	5	3	2	0
Destroyer Coastal	5	1	4	0
Destroyer Escort	2	1	1	0
Corvette	3	2	1	0
Submarine	8	2	2	4
Fleet Minesweeper	6	4	0	2
Totals	29	13	10	6

E. Denmark (As of 1 June 1950).

Destroyer, Coastal	10	3	2	5
Escort	3	2	0	1
Submarine	3	2	1	0
Totals	16	7	3	6

F. Belgium (As of 1 June 1950).

Fleet Minesweeper <sup>1</sup>	2	2	-	-
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1. Belgium is to receive 4 fleet minesweepers from United Kingdom.

G. France (As of 1 June 1950).

Battleship	2	1	1	-
Old Battleship(obsolete)	1	-	-	1

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	<u>Total</u>	<u>Operational</u>	<u>Non-Operational</u>	<u>Reserve</u>
Light Carrier	1	1	-	-
Escort Carrier	1	1	-	-
Old Heavy Cruiser	3	-	-	3
Light Cruiser	7	7	-	-
Old Light Cruiser	1	1	-	-
Destroyer	12	7	-	5
Escorts (DE, PG, PF.)	21	21	-	-
Submarine	10	9	-	1
Old Submarine	2	2	-	2
Fleet Minesweeper	<u>24</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2</u>
Totals	85	72	1	14

H. Italy (As of 1 June 1950).

Old Battleship	2	2	-	-
Light Cruiser	4	2	1	1
Destroyer	4	3	1	-
Destroyer, Coastal	15	11	4	-
Escort (PCE)	<u>20</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>-</u>
Totals	45	33	11	1

I. Netherlands (As of 1 June 1950).

Light Carrier	1	1	-	-
Light Cruiser	2	1	-	1
Destroyer	6	5	1	-
Escort (DE, PG, PF)	7 <sup>1</sup>	4 <sup>1</sup>	1	2
Submarine	7	5	2	-
Fleet Minesweeper	12	11	1	-
Minelayer	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Totals	38	30	5	3

1. 2 destroyer escorts received from US under MDAF on 1 June 1950 .

J. Portugal (As of 1 June 1950).

Destroyer	5	5	-	-
Escort (PF, PG)	8	7	1	-
Submarine	3	3	-	-
Old Submarine	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>
Totals	19	17	2	0

K. Greece (As of 1 June 1950).

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Operational</u>	<u>Non-Operational</u>	<u>Reserve</u>
Old heavy cruiser	1	~	~	1 (immobilized)
Destroyer	2	1	~	1
Destroyer Escort	8	3	~	5
Submarine	6	4	~	2
Corvette	4	2	~	2
Minecraft	45	32	~	13
LST	9	5	~	4
LCT	12	6	~	6
Totals	87	53	-	34

L. Turkey (As of 1 June 1950).

Turkey has 190 naval vessels of all types including 1 old Battleship, 2 old Light Cruisers, 8 Destroyers, 2 Destroyer Escorts, and 10 Submarines.

M. Iran (As of 1 June 1950).

Iran has 10 naval vessels of all types including 1 repair ship, 1 Destroyer Escort and 8 minor craft.

3. Military Aircraft of MDAP Countries.

A. Belgium (As of 1 June 1950).

	<u>Total</u>	<u>In Tactical Units</u>
Bomber	—	—
Attack	—	—
Fighter	160	87
Reconnaissance	—	—
Transport	26	25
Miscellaneous	<u>219</u>	<u>26</u>
Totals	405	138

B. France (As of 1 June 1950).

	<u>Air Force</u>	
Bomber	41	20
Attack	—	—
Fighter	577	235
Reconnaissance	61	42
Transport	309	175
Miscellaneous	<u>1,844</u>	<u>48</u>
Totals	2,832	583

	<u>Naval Air Force</u>	
Bomber	48	15
Attack	52	14
Fighter	203	20
Reconnaissance	59	39
Transport	28	18
Miscellaneous	<u>102</u>	<u>—</u>
Totals	492	106

C. Italy (As of 1 June 1950).

	<u>Total</u>	<u>In Tactical Units</u>
Bomber	--	--
Attack	--	--
Fighter	172	158
Reconnaissance	58	32
Transport	97	72
Miscellaneous	<u>65</u>	<u>--</u>
Totals	392	262

D. Netherlands (As of 1 June 1950).

Air Force (Metropolitan)

Bomber	--	--
Attack	--	--
Fighter	50	15
Reconnaissance	--	--
Transport	10	7
Miscellaneous	<u>303</u>	<u>10</u>
Totals	363	32

Naval Air Force

Bomber	15	6
Attack	--	--
Fighter	77	53
Reconnaissance	22	12
Transport	14	7
Miscellaneous	<u>14</u>	<u>--</u>
Totals	142	78

Air Force (East Indies Army)

Bomber	44	25
Attack	--	--
Fighter	59	27
Reconnaissance	--	--
Transport	27	21
Miscellaneous	<u>134</u>	<u>43</u>
Totals	264	116

E. Portugal (As of 1 June 1950).

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Air Force</u> <u>In Tactical Units</u>
Bomber	4	4
Attack	--	--
Fighter	176	98
Reconnaissance	--	--
Transport	10	9
Miscellaneous	<u>112</u>	<u>13</u>
Totals	302	124

	<u>Naval Air Force</u>
Bomber	--
Attack	--
Fighter	15
Reconnaissance	--
Transport	3
Miscellaneous	<u>61</u>
Totals	79

F. Greece (As of 1 June 1950).

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Operational</u>
Attack bombers	136	76
Dive Bombers	45	21
Military transport	57	22
Liaison/observation	60	38
Trainers	<u>109</u>	<u>60</u>
Totals	407	217

G. Turkey (As of 1 June 1950).

CIA does not have the latest breakdown by types of Turkey's 264 military aircraft. The Turkish Air Force is being trained and developed under guidance of the US, and consists of a balanced force of aircraft almost entirely of US and UK origin, with a heavy stress at present upon trainers. The balance consists principally of intercept and penetration fighters, light bombers, and transport airplanes. There are no medium or heavy bombers or jet aircraft.



H. Iran (As of 1 June 1950).

Iran has a total of 264 aircraft of which 89 are first line fighters-- Thunderbolts and Hurricanes. The remainder are transports and miscellaneous aircraft.

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### APPENDIX III

#### Chinese Nationalist Military Strength

The present military strength of the Nationalists is reported to total 495,000. Of these, 370,000 are Army, 81,000 Air Force, and 44,000 Navy (including 12,700 Marines).

Of the total Army strength some 65,000 troops are located on Quemoy Island with the remainder on Taiwan and in the Pescadores. The Army total largely consists of infantry strength but includes 29,000 Armored Force personnel and 9,000 in the Artillery Command.

The Air Force consists of two light bomber groups, four fighter groups, two transport groups, and one photographic reconnaissance; all based on Taiwan. Aircraft strength is as follows:

	<u>Total</u>	<u>In Tactical Units*</u>
Light Bomber	124	91
Fighter	196	179
Transport	265	148
Photographic	16	13
Trainer	235	—
Miscellaneous	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>
Totals	845	433

The Nationalist Navy has a total of 60 combat vessels, broken down as follows:

	<u>In Operation</u>	<u>Under Repair</u>
Destroyers	1	0
Destroyer Escort	9	1
Patrol Craft	1	0
Submarine Chaser	0	2
Gun Boat	1	3
Motor Gun Boat	1	1
Mine Layer	0	1
Mine Sweeper	6	2
Landing Ship-Tank	8	3
Landing Ship-Med	3	5
Landing Ship-Infantry	1	4
Auxiliaries	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
Totals	34	26

In addition to these 60 ships, the Nationalists have a comparatively large number of smaller craft available for patrol operations.

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\*Sixty percent serviceable.